FLICKR PHOTOSTREAM


(Click on photo to see infomation)

Monday, January 25, 2010

Turning the Tide: Opinion Polls from Afghanistan by Dr. Jack Kem

There have been a number of recent surveys and reports that have released in the past two weeks concerning the situation in Afghanistan. One of the most prominent surveys was conducted for ABC News, the BBC and ARD by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) based in Kabul. This poll surveyed a random national sample 1,534 Afghan adults from 11-23 December, 2009.

ABC News published an analysis of the poll by Gary Langer entitled “Views Improve Sharply in Afghanistan, Though Criticisms of the U.S. Stay High” on January 11, 2013:

Hopes for a brighter future have soared in Afghanistan, bolstered by a broad rally in support for the country's re-elected president, improved development efforts and economic gains. Blame on the United States and NATO for violence has eased – but their overall ratings remain weak.

In one key shift, the latest poll by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV finds that sharply more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country's strife, while many fewer blame the United States or its allies – significant progress in a central aim of the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

In this poll, the first question asked the simple question “Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” The answers to this question were striking; last year, 40% of the respondents answered that things were going in the right direction; in this most recent poll, 70% responded that things were going in the right direction – an increase of 30%. Bottom line – most Afghans think things are getting better.

Another interesting question (question #18) asked “Who do you blame the most for the violence that is occurring in the country?” Last year the top two answers were “Taliban” and “Al Qaeda/foreign jihadis” with responses of 27% and 22% respectively, for a total of 49%. In this most recent poll, the two top answers remained “Taliban” and “Al Qaeda/foreign jihadis” with responses of 42% and 24% respectively, for a total of 66%. Bottom line – most Afghans blame the Taliban and Al Qaeda/foreign jihadis for the violence.

Two of the questions on the poll were directed at reconciliation and reintegration with the Taliban. The first of these questions (#21) asked “Do you think the government in Kabul should negotiate a settlement with Afghan Taliban in which they are allowed to hold political offices if they agree to stop fighting, or do you think the government in Kabul should continue to fight the Taliban and not enter into these negotiations?” The answers from last year and this year were very similar; last year, 64% of the respondents indicated the government should negotiate a settlement; in this most recent poll, 65% were in favor of a negotiated settlement.

Question #22 asked a related question: “Do you think the government should negotiate only if the Taliban first stop fighting, or negotiate even as fighting continues?” Last year, 71% responded “Negotiate only if the Taliban stop fighting” – in this most recent poll, 76% responded the same. Bottom line – most Afghans are willing to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban – but only if they stop fighting first.

Not all of the information from the polls was positive. One of the areas that has been emphasized from ISAF has been the focus on controlling civilian casualties. Question #34 addresses this question: “When civilians are harmed in U.S. and NATO/ISAF air strikes, who do you mainly blame?” Last year, the answers were 41% blamed U.S and NATO/ISAF forces for mistaken targeting; 28% blamed anti-government forces for being among civilians; and 27% blamed both sides equally. In this recent poll, the responses were 36% blamed U.S and NATO/ISAF forces for mistaken targeting; 35% blamed anti-government forces for being among civilians; and 26% blamed both sides equally. Bottom line – Afghans blame both U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces and anti-government forces almost equally for civilian casualties.

The press release for the poll from the BBC News gave the following summary:

A national opinion poll in Afghanistan has recorded results dramatically different from a year ago, suggesting that Afghans feel much better about their lives and increasingly confident about the future. Support for the re-elected President Karzai has rallied, the Taliban remain deeply unpopular, and there has been a softening of attitudes towards foreign troops.

Bulletproof by Clayton Perce

I always appreciate seeing the Afghan national flag flying from a building or tower. To me, it represents a symbolic acknowledgement that Afghanistan is more than just a loose collection of tribes…that there’s a real nation here, proud and strong.

There are conflicting descriptions of what the colors represent, but I like this one, paraphrased from Flags of the World:

The three colours of the flag represent a different page in the history of Afghanistan. The black represents the 19th century era when Afghanistan was occupied and did not have independence, red marks the fight for independence and the green shows independence had been achieved.

Additionally, the colors have specific meanings within the Islamic faith. We’re taught that green stands for service to God, red for sacrifice, and black for martyrdom.

I see these colors symbolic of the members of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Coalition serving here in Afghanistan as well. To me, the green vertical represents service writ large…service to each other, our families, our Service, our nations, and the God of our choosing. The red vertical is the sacrifices we make in order to build Afghanistan and protect its people…for some, a blood sacrifice. And the black signifies those who have given their lives for Afghanistan…445 Coalition members and 1,030 Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army members in 2009 alone.

Bottom line: Strips of cloth can be damaged easily, especially in a country like Afghanistan. But a flag represents an idea, and ideas are bulletproof.

Afghanistan: Banning Ammonium Nitrate by Dr. Jack Kem

On January 22, 2010, President Karzai published a decree that banned the use, production, storage or sale of ammonium nitrate – a fertilizer that has been used widely by the Taliban to produce IEDs. His decree also ordered the government to “train and equip Afghan police and custom officers within one month to detect and confiscate" the fertilizer within Afghanistan.

The use of ammonium nitrate, mixed with fuel oil, was the method used by Timothy McVeigh in 1995 for the Oklahoma City bombing that destroyed the Murrah Building. McVeigh used a 600-pound ammonium nitrate that resulted in killing 168 people. Ammonium nitrate was also used in the 2002 nightclub bombings in Bali in which 202 people died.

In November 2009, a major cache of ammonium nitrate was discovered in Kandahar. Dexter Filkins of the New York Times wrote a story entitled “Bomb Material Cache Uncovered in Afghanistan” on November 10, 2009 on the raids:

With fertilizer bombs now the most lethal weapons used against American and NATO soldiers in southern Afghanistan, the bomb-making operation in Kandahar was something close to astonishing. In a pair of raids on Sunday, Afghan police officers and American soldiers discovered a half-million pounds of ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer that is used in the overwhelming majority of homemade bombs here. About 2,000 bomb-making devices like timers and triggers were also found, and 15 Afghans were detained.

With a typical homemade bomb weighing no more than 60 pounds, the seizure of that much fertilizer — more than 10 tractor-trailer loads — removed potentially thousands of bombs from the streets and trails of southern Afghanistan, officials said. “You can turn a bag of ammonium nitrate into a bomb in a matter of hours,” said Col. Mark Lee, who leads NATO’s effort to stop the bomb makers in southern Afghanistan. “This is a great first step.”

Concerning the recent announcement banning ammonium nitrate, The Wall Street Journal published an article by Alan Cullison and Yaroslav Trofimov entitled “Karzai Bans Ingredient of Taliban's Roadside Bombs” on January 22, 2010:

The Afghan government banned ammonium nitrate fertilizers, the key ingredient of roadside bombs that have emerged as the deadliest weapon used by Taliban fighters against NATO troops in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has been seizing the fertilizer on its own since summer, has identified the primitive, fertilizer-packed roadside bomb as the weapon of choice of Taliban insurgents. Commanders say it could be as crucial to the Taliban as the surface-to-air missile was to the Afghan mujahedeen warriors in their fight in the 1980s against the Soviets.

Troops have been discovering ever-larger caches of the fertilizer in recent months—a possible clue, NATO officials say, that militants plan to use the material as a centerpiece of their strategy this year. The Taliban have used improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, with increasingly deadly effect as the insurgency has picked up steam and the militants have become more sophisticated in their execution. IEDs killed 20 of the 32 of the coalition troops who died in the first weeks of January. Almost all of the bombs were made from nitrate fertilizer.

President Hamid Karzai, in a decree issued Friday, banned the use, production, storage or sale of ammonium nitrate, and gave Afghans 30 days to turn over any supplies to authorities. He also ordered government ministries to "train and equip Afghan police and custom officers within one month to detect and confiscate" any of the fertilizer in the country or at its borders.

The Wall Street Journal article also states that “NATO estimates that as little as 5% of the nitrate fertilizer entering Afghanistan goes to legitimate use.” As a result, the ban on ammonium nitrate should have a negligible impact on agriculture in Afghanistan. The Boston Globe published an Associate Press Story by Amir Shah and Robert H. Reed on January 23, 2010 entitled “Afghanistan bans fertilizer used in bombs: Aims to reduce Taliban’s access to chemical” that reported on how the ban is being perceived by farmers in Afghanistan:

Mir Dad Panjshiri, an official in the Afghan Agriculture Ministry, said the government had been discouraging the use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer for years because urea fertilizer is better suited to Afghan soils. He said businessmen began importing ammonium nitrate fertilizer in large amounts last year, mostly from Central Asia and Pakistan. “We detected an increase in the use of the fertilizer over the past year by poor farmers in the southern provinces,’’ Panjshiri said. “It’s not available everywhere. These poor farmers didn’t know what they bought.’’

He said the government was confident it could enforce the ban on its northern borders with Central Asia, but “my concern is more in the south because we have a long border with Pakistan and it’s available there.’’

…Nevertheless, some farmers said they preferred ammonium nitrate fertilizer and expressed frustration over the ban. “If the government and NATO forces want to stop fertilizer which they think is used in explosives, they should invest money and make a deal with some other country to import good quality fertilizers,’’ said Ezatullah, a farmer from Kandahar Province who like many Afghans uses only one name. “We haven’t received any improved seeds or fertilizers. We are not happy.’’

The new ban on ammonium nitrate won’t completely eliminate IED’s but will make them more difficult to manufacture – a welcome step towards protecting coalition troops and the Afghan people.

Friday, January 22, 2010

The bigger concern by Clayton Perce

Afghanistan: Less corrupt than Somalia!

That’s not exactly the kind of slogan the Afghan Ministry of Tourism wants, but unfortunately, that’s the best they can do. According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the second-most corrupt country on the planet. Only Somalia is worse. Haiti is a whopping eight spots higher on the list. And that has a direct impact on the counter-insurgency fight here in Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Security Forces performed well during this week’s attacks in Kabul, but as Alissa J. Rubin of the NY Times found, Afghans like Noor ul-Haq Uloumi, a member of Parliament who sits on its Defense Committee, can’t help but wonder, “How come these terrorists are able to come all the way from the border to Kabul with all their ammunitions and stuff?” The obvious answer: Corruption. “There are many reports of cases where guards have been bribed to enable criminals or insurgents to move through an area…if we cannot eliminate corruption in the government and cannot make a government based on the rule of law to serve the people of Afghanistan, this corruption can bring many of such attacks.”

The UN Office of Drugs and Crime recently released the results of a survey on Corruption in Afghanistan, and it’s sobering.

Poverty and violence are usually portrayed as the biggest challenges confronting Afghanistan. But ask the Afghans themselves, and you get a different answer: corruption is their biggest worry. An overwhelming 59 per cent of Afghans view public dishonesty as a bigger concern than insecurity (54 per cent) and unemployment (52 per cent).

Obviously, as part of the Coalition supporting the surge in Afghan National Security Forces, my focus has been almost entirely on security. But it’s clear I need to take a broader view. Part of that is simply keeping a more watchful eye on the senior Afghan communicators with whom I interact. They have ample opportunities for corruption – selling permission to use radio frequencies, forcing contractors to pay bribes (commonly called “pen fees” if a signature is needed to complete a bureaucratic process or “walking fees” if it requires simple facilitation), and smoothing the transfer of communications equipment through Customs. I haven’t seen much, if any, of this. But I haven’t been looking closely. Another part is providing support to efforts like the Ministry of the Interior’s Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) and Anti-corruption Hot Line call center. The biggest challenge, as a communicator, is that these efforts require a level of computer security not often seen in Afghanistan. There are not many electronic records in Afghanistan worth killing for. The electronic records of the MCTF and the telephone records of the call center may well be exceptions…

Bottom line: Perhaps StrategyPage says it best:

Behind the war is the real battle for Afghanistan, and the future of the country…poverty, illiteracy, ignorance and corruption. That’s the real war.

Tackling Corruption in Afghanistan by Dr. Jack Kem

This past week, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a scathing report entitled “Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims.” The United Nations News Centre posted a press release on the report entitled “Corruption, not insecurity, biggest concern for Afghans – UN report” on January 19, 2009:

While violence and poverty are widely thought to be the major challenges confronting Afghanistan, nearly 60 per cent of the population said corruption is their biggest concern, according to a new United Nations report, which states that Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes over the past 12 months.

“The Afghans say that it is impossible to obtain a public service without paying a bribe,” says Antonio Maria Costa, the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which published the report, “Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by Victims.”

A 2009 USAID Report entitled “Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan” defines corruption as “the abuse of public position for private gain” and describes corruption as “a significant and growing problem across Afghanistan that undermines security, state and democracy building, and development.” The problem is indeed growing; according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Afghanistan has steadily worsened their international ranking in terms of corruption – from a ranking of 117th out of 159 countries covered in 2005, to 172nd of 180 countries in 2007, to 176th out of 180 countries in 2008, and finally to 179th out of 180 countries in 2009 (just above Somalia).

Corruption is sure to be one of the major topic areas to be discussed at the London Conference on Afghanistan on January 28, 2009. According to a recent Voice of America (VOA) story posted on January 19, 2009 entitled “UN Says Corruption Biggest Problem for Afghanistan,” UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa stated that the scale of corruption was equivalent to nearly a quarter of the country's economic output: "The dimension of the payments, which ends in the pockets of the corrupt officials is so big, it is a quarter of the GDP - $2.5 billion estimated." The VOA story continues:

President Karzai has repeatedly said his government is making efforts to tackle corruption, but critics say not nearly enough is being done.

Costa warns that if corruption is not tackled the Afghan people could well lose faith in the international community's efforts, with dire consequences. "I am afraid that at one point the Afghan people or many in the population will run out of options and as a consequence the insurgency will acquire a legitimacy which definitely it does not have at the moment," said Costa. He says that will only help the Taliban and their allies.

The report was released before the international conference on Afghanistan in London, where President Karzai is expected to face more calls by world leaders to tackle corruption.

The issue of attacking corruption and developing institutions that reinforce transparency is an important issue in showing “demonstrable progress” in Afghanistan. As President Obama stated in his speech at West Point on December 1, 2009:

We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Deadly Attack in Kabul: January 18, 2010 by Dr. Jack Kem

Monday morning at around 10:30 we heard the first explosion – it was obviously a small explosion (unlike a car bomb), so the assumption was that we heard the explosion that came from a suicide vest. Not long after we heard the distinctive “rat-a-tat-tat” from AK rifles, a clear sign that the Afghans forces were responding to the situation.

Not long after there was another explosion; this one was still a small explosion, but closer… but the shooting was obviously out in the Afghan version of the “Green Zone” where Afghans are responsible for security. The small arms fire wasn’t constant, but instead a quick series of gunfire punctuated by silence as we wondered what was really happening.

Naturally, the best source of news was the TV – and, in Kabul, the best source (at least in English) is Al Jazeera. The story was reported clearly and accurately – and before long the picture showed some of the buildings on fire. A look out the window at the billowing smoke confirmed that the fighting was close – not all that close, but close enough to hear the gunfire, the explosions, and evidence of the buildings on fire.

It wasn’t long before the gunfire died down, and the loudest noise was the sound of a number of helicopters flying overhead, including Afghan MI-35 gunships. It also wasn’t long before the coverage on Al Jazeera switched back and forth between the situation in Kabul and events in the rest of the world.

It was a tragedy. Innocent civilians and Afghan soldiers and policemen were killed and wounded; the relative calm of Kabul was interrupted by a daring complex attack by the Taliban. Amidst the tragedy, however, the response by the Afghan Army and Police was immediate, and was led by Afghans. In less than five hours the situation was under control – which sounds (and feels) like a long time, but is quite an achievement when compared to recent terrorist attacks in major cities in other countries.

Dexter Filkins of the New York Times wasn’t far away. He posted a blog entitled “A Little Too Close to the Battle in Kabul” where he described the scene:

The war in Afghanistan does not come often to its capital. By and large the fight unfolds in the countryside, where the insurgents are, where the people live. For a capital at war, Kabul on most days is a remarkably quiet place, with daily life unfolding in its ordinary way. In this respect, it differs vastly from the capital city of that other American war, Baghdad, where the guerrillas and terrorists and government soldiers fought and died every morning for years.

Yet there the insurgents were, not 50 yards from the palace of President Hamid Karzai, trying to fight their way into one of the country’s most important institutions. They’d come wrapped in baggy shawls, under which they’d hidden their guns and grenades and suicide vests. First dozens, then hundreds of Afghans rolled toward the fight, some in uniform, some in slacks, some with polished American gear, some with the rusting antiquated junk left behind from the Soviet epoch.

And they fought. The Afghan soldiers were undisciplined and chaotic, but no one flinched and everyone fired. They rushed to the battle like kids to a school yard brawl. After three decades of uninterrupted warfare, that’s the way it is here.

Daniel Korski wrote a blog on the U.K. Spectator Coffee House Blog entitled “Deadly attack in Kabul = Taliban on the defensive” on January 19, 2010, where he provided his perspective:

Many will claim that the Taliban’s recent attack in Kabul shows how powerful the insurgency has become. No doubt the psychological impact – the real aim of all terrorists - will be felt for some time. Faroshga market, one of the city’s most popular shopping malls, lay in ruins and the normally bustling streets of Kabul emptied.

But the attack was an operational failure. All seven militants died in the attack; five were gunned down and two killed themselves. Three soldiers and two civilians — including one child — were killed. Seventy-one others were injured, including 35 civilians, but the majority are only slightly wounded. Such a toll must frustrate the Taliban’s leaders, watching the event from afar. Like previous attacks in Kabul, the local security forces seemed to have acted professionally and courageously. Compared to the Mumbai attack or even their previous commando-style raid on the Serena hotel, this attack was unimpressive.

It is more likely that the Taliban has been feeling the pressure and are on the defensive. The US, streaming soldiers into the south, will take the fight to the Taliban and aim to hold territory. The Karzai government, meanwhile, has begun talking up lavish new incentives of jobs and training for defectors. The world’s attention has moved on, first to Copenhagen and now Haiti. If there is one thing terrorists hate, truly hate, it is to be forgotten. What better way to remind the world that they exist than to strike in Kabul?

It wasn’t a good day for Kabul, but it was a worse day for the Taliban. The Afghan Security Forces responded to a threat to their capital, and will no doubt gain confidence and learn from the experience. Perhaps the most telling story of this confidence and leadership was related by Dexter Filkins in his blog:

“Should I abandon my post?” an Afghan soldier shouted into his radio.

“Stay!” his commander barked back, guns booming all around. “Stay at your post and fight!”

6 hours in Kabul by Clayton Perce

Those who watch the Postometer to the right are probably wondering if I’ve lost my mind. As I type this, Google News is showing 1217 articles and 91 images regarding today’s attacks in Kabul…and I have the audacity to write a “cautiously optimistic” post?!?

Well, yes.

When the attacks started today, my first concern was about the people in my directorate. At the time of the attacks, we had a number of people working with Afghans “outside the wire”…we knew where they were, but we didn’t know exactly where the fighting was, so – as always – the situation was a little tense until we determined everyone was ”all present or accounted for.”

My second concern, though, was about the Afghans we had trained, advised, and equipped. Soldiers, policemen, and policewomen were in the streets, using short-range and long-range radios to coordinate the fight against the insurgents and gain medical support for the injured. They were also in the National Military Command Center, the National Police Command Center, and other locations, using video teleconference systems, telephones, computers, and surveillance cameras to gain situational awareness and coordinate the responses of subordinate units. And we – Afghan and Coalition communicators alike – were responsible. I knew we’d done well, but at that point I could only hope it was good enough.

It was.

Could we – the communicators, I mean – have done better? Certainly. Over the next few days we’ll conduct hard-nosed after-action reviews, looking at what went right and what went wrong. And we’ll become better for it.

Over the next few days we’ll also learn and share stories about the heroes…a policeman, perhaps, who stopped a vehicle-borne IED at an entry control point, giving his life but protecting everyone on the other side. Or a soldier perhaps, killed while retaking one of the hotels. And we’ll become better for it.

Bottom line: It utterly rots that 7 terrorists were able to attack soft targets in Afghanistan’s largest city today, killing 5 and injuring 70 during 6 hours of fighting. However, compared with the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, (where 10 terrorists attacked soft targets in India’s largest city, killing 173 and injuring 308 over 2-1/2 days of fighting), it’s clear the Afghan National Security Forces did pretty well.

Monday, January 18, 2010

Reintegration: Embracing the ‘small-t’ Taliban by Dr. Jack Kem

A previous blog entitled Afghanistan: Reconciliation and Reintegration described the doctrinal distinction between reconciliation (focused on the leadership of the Taliban) and reintegration (focused on the individual fighter). In the past few days, there have been a number of stories about the reintegration efforts in Afghanistan – focusing on the “small t” Taliban fighters to “receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace.”

The New York Times published an article by Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin entitled “Karzai Closing In on Taliban Reconciliation Plan” on January 17, 2010. This article describes the efforts that the Karzai government is currently working on to develop a reintegration plan:

The Afghan government will soon unveil a major new plan offering jobs, security, education and other social benefits to Taliban followers who defect, according to the spokesman for President Hamid Karzai. The plan, in the final stages of preparation, will go beyond the government’s previous offers to the Taliban, Waheed Omer, the spokesman, said at a news conference on Sunday. “The mistakes we have committed before have been considered in developing this new plan,” he said. “We have not done enough.”

The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at luring large numbers of the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to change sides, and has qualified support from American officials. Afghan officials are hoping to finance the plan through pledges from the international community to be made at a London conference on Afghanistan planned for Jan. 28.

The Washington Post published an Associated Press article by Deb Riechmann entitled “US supports Afghan plan to reintegrate Taliban” on January 17, 2010. The article describes the US reaction to the proposed reintegration program:

The U.S. supports a proposal to lure fighters with no strong allegiance to terrorists away from the insurgency and reintegrate them into Afghan society, the American special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan said Sunday. Richard Holbrooke said he talked with Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Sunday about a plan the government is crafting to offer jobs, vocational training and other economic incentives to tens of thousands of Taliban foot soldiers willing to switch sides after eight years of war.

"We completely support the program as it develops," Holbrooke said. "The majority of the people fighting with the Taliban are not supporters of (Taliban leader) Mullah Omar. They're not supporters of the ideology of al-Qaida. They don't even know who al-Qaida is and yet they fight because they've been misled by false information."

On Monday, January 18, 2010, outgoing United Nations envoy Kai Eide made comments about the agenda for the London Conference on Afghanistan that will take place on January 28, 2010. His comments, reported in a Reuters news story entitled “Shift aid focus in Afghanistan, says U.N. envoy,” addressed the reconciliation and reintegration programs that are being developed in Afghanistan:

Eide said a goal of an international conference in London on January 28 was to come up with a more coherent plan to deliver assistance and boost Afghan capacity. Another focus would be on how best to reintegrate Afghan fighters into society and donors' plans to put seed money into a trust fund for this purpose. Britain, Japan and the United States have the lead on this.

There needed to be reconciliation efforts at the same time as reintegration, said Eide. Earlier this month the Afghan ambassador to the United Nations gave the Security Council's sanctions committee a list of names of Taliban members who Kabul feels should be removed from the U.N. sanctions list in exchange for supporting the government. "I strongly hope that process will now be pursued," he said. "This would be a very important confidence building measure which could help bring us into a peace process."

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton provided the following during her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 3, 2009:

We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and renounce al Qaeda.

Putting it down on paper....... by Matt Miller

Today was a long day, but extremely productive. Most of the folks in the department I work in took a day to focus on the way ahead in connecting NTM-A/CSTC-A members that reside outside of Camp Eggers. Specifically focusing on projects at our numerous sites. While this put a dent in my plans to focus on BlackBerry servers and commercial Internet it was time well spent.

Myself along with two other O-4s, an O-5 and four Navy E-7s charted out exactly what we should be focused on projects in the coming months. Not only what we should focus on but how we are going to accomplish it, how we should prepare for it and when we are going to do it.

The first thing we developed was the Table of Contents for a binder that would contain everything (or as much as we could think of) a person should know about a specific site. What the mission of the site, the mission of the unit, the relevant points of contact, etc. These are all things most people that have dabbled in project management know in the back of mind. However, it was rather powerful to put on paper...not to mention have other extremely smart project managers in the room to share their insights and experiences. I mentioned putting this down on paper (and stored electronically)...this is perhaps the best thing we can do, especially in deployed environment where people come into and out of the area of operations every six months. This will be something that can be passed down and built upon for the folks that come behind us to carry the projects and mission forward. I don't know how many times in the past week alone I've wanted to know something (more) about a certain decision or project that just wasn't available because it was on paper (or email).

The work we've done today is the first step in setting out successors up for success not to mention putting field units on a faster track to advise and mentor the Afghan National Army and National Police.

Fire the communicator by Dean Vrable

A week ago, NTM-A/CSTC-A (the command I work for) sent a team to an Afghan village to investigate, I believe, allegations that coalition forces caused the deaths of several Afghan civilians. The team was headed by a two star General, and consisted of a small cadre of military members. The task to my branch (CJ-6 Operations) was to set this team up with a stand-alone network (self contained… not connected to the outside world) that would enable them to collaborate while they completed their due diligence.

A Navy Lieutenant Commander (0-4 equivalent to a Marine Major) heads up, among other things, my “CG’s Comm Team” – the team of military members responsible for ensuring that the Commanding General has ubiquitous communication capability. His first task was to recommend which communicator would accompany the team and set up this network upon arrival. Since the General assigned to this investigation had already completed one with a communicator that was still in the CJ-6, the recommendation was easy. The decision was made, coordination completed, and that communicator reported to the LCDR to begin preparing the equipment. The communicator knew exactly what was taken on the previous trip, so he simply stated his requirements, the LCDR initiated the tasking, and the communicator collected the equipment.

When the LCDR briefed me that everything was assembled and ready, I directed him to set everything up in the conference room and prep a demo for me to ensure that everything worked. Upon completion of the successful demo, the LCDR and I proceeded to brainstorm all of the redundancies we could build into the equipment set to ensure that the team could still operate in the event of catastrophic equipment failure… thumb drives for file transfers, extra batteries, cables, laptops, hard drives, ink cartridges for the printer, etc. To my relief, the LCDR and the communicator on the team had already covered these bases. Then it dawned on me that we only had one network switch to connect everything; so I told the LCDR to round up another one.

After an exhaustive search, he came back to tell me that we had no spares, which came as a shock to me. With only one week on the ground at the time, I assumed that we would’ve had a stockpile of comm equipment for the myriad of similar missions that we are tasked with. I made a mental note to review our outstanding equipment orders; and to have my staff put the paperwork together for any future requirements that were not already on order. I told the LCDR that we couldn’t send this team out without an extra hub or switch, to which he replied that the mini-exchange (retail store) on the compound sells a small hub for $40 that could serve as a back-up. I gave him the $40 and told him to buy it. He came back a few minutes later and handed me my money back, saying that the hub was too small to support all the devices that would be on the network. Disappointed, I tasked him with double-checking with every communicator on the compound to see if one would surface. Unfortunately, it was already too late to send someone to another base to pick one up.

I thought to myself as I sent Tony off on this wild goose chase, “Is it really that big of a deal? What are the odds that the switch, of all things, would fail on this five day (or so) trip?” Then I recalled an occasion in Iraq where the unthinkable happened… I was dual-hatted as Headquarters and Service Battalion Executive Officer and Communication Company Commander. On one particular day, one of my Comm Company leaders came to me and said, “Sir, both of our generators are about to fail” (he used a different phrase, but I’ll err on the side of political correctness here). We had two 350Kw commercial generators pushing more power than we could possibly use on our compound; but we were in the desert (for the engineers reading this, no, the generators weren’t wet stacking); and the generators we were using, as well maintained as we kept them (at the time, the brother – great guy - of the Commandant of the Marine Corps was our generator maintainer; but that’s another story), were not equipped for the 24/7 dusty grind that we were putting them through.

Since the Battalion Commander was travelling, and I was his second in command, I happened to be the Battalion Commander on that particular day. Coincidentally, there happened to be a Commanding General’s (CG’s) staff meeting that morning; and, because I was “acting” Battalion Commander, I had a seat at the table and a briefing role. When my turn came, I said, “Sir, you are about to lose all communications throughout the Al Anbar Province.” He said, “What’s going on?”. When I briefed him on the situation with the generators, he said, “What do you need?”. “Triple redundancy, sir. I need another 350Kw generator”, I replied, wondering if that was really the correct term – if you have two backups, is that considered double redundancy or triple? But Marine speak seemed most appropriate, so I went with triple because it has the number three and I needed a total of three generators.

The CG looked at the Engineer Battalion Commander and said, “Make it happen, Joe”. I was in awe of the trust the CG had placed in my advice; and at the speed with which he made the decision and was able to effect the change. In a very short time, another huge 350 watt generator was plopped onto the Comm Company compound; and, as the engineers were connecting it, the unthinkable happened… both of the existing generators failed. I wondered if the engineers made this happen for effect, but quickly dismissed the thought as I realized that the 2nd Marine Logistics Group had just lost all network connectivity to the outside world; and we had convoys out all over the province. Fortunately, the total outage was no more than fifteen minutes, since all of the pieces were in place, and the engineers were in the final stages of connecting the third generator… a few minutes of downtime for something that could have taken hours or even days, thanks to the moral courage and foresight of my Marines; and to the decisiveness of the General and the quick response of the Engineer Battalion.

The lessons I learned that day were forever etched in my memory. So yes, there must be an extra switch… we cannot send this team out without one. I didn’t want to be responsible for any delays this team might face, potentially keeping them in harm’s way long enough for a suicide bomber to kill them all. Sure, we included thumb drives; and the team could have used them to transfer files between the computers, but it would cost them time that I didn’t think they had.

Tony returned with no luck. I knew by the look on his face that he had done everything he could. “Here, go buy the hub”, I said. Tony and I knew that the hub was the next best redundant solution. The hub was purchased, the gear packed up, and the team left… fire and forget. We then went on with our mission as the team of investigators headed off on theirs.

Last night, as I returned from a terrific Q&A session that the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and MCPON (Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy) held with the Marines and Sailors of NTM-A/CSTC-A (the subject of a future BLOG), imagine my surprise when Tony said, “Sir, the switch failed on the last day of the investigation.” “Damn”, I thought, we failed them… forgetting in that instant that we actually did have the base covered. Tony smiled and said, “They pulled out the hub and were back on line in a minute." He then proceeded to tell me how the team had to leave the printer unplugged until they needed to print, at which time one of them would have to give up their network connectivity so another could print; but they still had full network capability. What a relief.

I still don’t know how the General perceived the failure of equipment and rapid recovery – he may have been pissed that he couldn’t print immediately; but that little hub represented a fairly sizeable victory for the CJ-6 ops branch. Unfortunately in our profession, victory comes in the form of transparency… if comm is up, nobody notices and very seldom is the team praised for such success. When comm goes down, everybody notices and criticisms abound.

Brigadier General Craparotta, Assistant Division Commander of the Second Marine Division, and a Marine for whom I have great respect, has a three part saying for fixing communication problems – wisdom that he imparted upon me during a staff meeting when I was his G-6 (senior communicator) after an important Video Teleconference (VTC) between him and the Commanding General (his boss) in the desert had just failed. I don’t remember the first two lines; but the last one resonates with me… “Fire the communicator”.

Not today boss…

The 762 retirement plan by Clayton Perce

Afghan phrase of the day: “762 retirement.”

There’s no real retirement plan for members of the ANA or ANP. We’ve done a bunch of work to put together an affordable yet decent retirement plan, but (as in any other country in the world) something like this is a HUGE political deal, so it’s seriously wrapped up in Parliament. Not having a decent retirement plan is–for obvious reasons–a big contributing factor to corruption. In a very real sense, skimming *is* the retirement plan. Or at least the preferred one! The other is the “762 retirement” plan. See, the insurgents use AK-47s, which take 7.62mm (in the US: 30 caliber) ammunition…

Which reminds me, there’s an ongoing issue on whether to issue M-16s or AK-47s to the Afghans. M-16s are the classic U.S. automatic rifle, and AK-47s are the classic Soviet (now Russian) one. In sterotypical Cold War fashion, the U.S. weapon is much more accurate, but also much more expensive and complex. So even though there’s a lot to be said for supporting U.S. weapon makers, there’s also a lot to be said for making the AK-47 the standard weapon here. One of the biggest selling points for the AK-47, especially as we try to accelerate the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces, is that the training program for AK-47 qualification is much faster than the corresponding program for M-16s. Everyone thought it was just familiarization, but there’s another issue that’s just recently surfaced:

Like I said, the M-16 is far more accurate. If you hold an M-16 correctly, and aim correctly, and breathe correctly, and squeeze the trigger correctly, you WILL hit your target. 100% guaranteed. But that isn’t necessarily a good thing in a culture where death should be Allah’s call, not yours. You do all that with an AK-47 and there’s still a fairly good chance you’ll miss. Allah’s call. And if you hold it at your waist, aim basically downrange, and breathe and squeeze however you want, I can pretty much guarantee that the only person who’s gonna get hit is someone Allah WANTS to be hit.

Bottom line: Every day here brings new and REALLY interesting cultural insights…

Sunday, January 17, 2010

"ACCC" lifts off....

The Air Corps' Air Command and Control Center (ACCC) continues to mature. Radio operators from the Communications Squadron have trained command center personnel on their high-frequency radio system. The command center now maintains connectivity with all of their detachments and a detailed report on the status of Air Corps aircraft has improved. Most importantly, the command center has now redirected an AN-32 aircraft in flight; a first. A tasked mission was already completed by an ISAF aircraft so the AN-32 was directed to its follow on missions location, saving fuel and time, just like a modern Air Force would do. It's a small step, but an important step.

MICHAEL R. BOERA, Brig Gen, USAF
Commanding General, CAPTF
Commander, 438 AEW

Mission-critical by Clayton Perce

One of the most important things we do is volunteer community relations, or VCR, missions. Led by NTM-A chaplains from Camp Eggers, volunteers distribute clothes and toys to places like schools, orphanages and medical centers in Kabul and surrounding areas. During the run-up to the Presidential Elections last year, the security situation in Kabul was the worst it’s been during my tour. Many days, roads were ‘black’, meaning we could only travel on them for absolutely mission-critical activities, and even then, only with the permission of our most senior officers. But even on those days, the VCR missions went on…the Command clearly demonstrated that VCR missions are a vital part of what we’re trying to accomplish here in Afghanistan. And that makes sense: VCR missions provide hope to Afghans that have none, and as the Afghans would say,

The world lives on hope.

In general, VCR missions take place once week. Unfortunately, because of the security and transportation challenges, only a handful of people can go on the actual mission. So the chaplains select randomly from the list of people who help out at the ‘VCR sort’. This first part is truly a sight to behold: Scores of military and civilian volunteers putting order to the massive chaos of items donated by individuals and charities from all over the world. It starts with a human chain, passing hundreds of boxes from the VCR storage area to a nearby open space. The volunteers then sort the boxes into smaller piles, organizing them by type: clothing for infants, boys, girls, men, and women; toys; blankets; jackets; winter shoes; normal shoes; and so on. Then it’s almost like Halloween: A non-stop line of people with bags, stopping at houses, and receiving treats. Except in this case it’s a line of volunteers with bags, stopping at each small pile, and receiving donated items from that station. By the time a volunteer has looped all the way around the sort area, his or her bag is jam-packed with a complete mix of donated goods…one family’s worth of stuff. A quick stop to tie off the bag and pick up another, then it’s back for another round. The whole thing happens VERY quickly and with a very little formal organization…almost like a bunch of ants taking on a task that’s WAY too big as individuals but easy as a swarm. Which is really the whole idea of the International Community’s work in Afghanistan…

Bottom line: VCR missions change lives…both the volunteer’s and the recipient’s.

Wicked Problems by Dr. Jack Kem

The “Wicked Problem” that is at the forefront for the next two years is “what to do about Afghanistan.” According to ISAF, their current mission today for the campaign in Afghanistan is:

ISAF conducts operations in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and in coordination with Operation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.
(http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/isafcampaignplansummary.pdf)

Within this campaign plan, there are three lines of operation: Security; Governance; and Reconstruction and Development. The key planning factors for the ISAF Afghanistan Campaign Plan are:

· Counterinsurgency campaign.
· Shape, in order to clear in order to hold and build.
· Prioritize the areas to clear and hold.
· Establish and maintain freedom of movement.
· Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus.
· Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders.
· Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region.
· Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.

The CAC Commander, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, recently wrote a blog on Small Wars Journal, where he stated, “As ideas of an Afghan “surge,” similar to the course of action adopted in Iraq, circulate among decision makers, the nuances of the Afghanistan situation remain particularly relevant.”
(http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/cac-cg-response-to-swj-blog-po/)

LTG Caldwell lists additional considerations for the situation in Afghanistan:

· Reconciling regional conflicts
· Building governmental capacity down to sub-district levels
· Training and reforming Afghan security forces
· (Providing) legal assistance / enforce the rule of law through a functioning Afghan court system
· Developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure

There are a number of strategy reviews that are reportedly being conducted for the “wicked problem” in Afghanistan. An excellent starting point for these reviews is to conduct a complete framing / reframing of the problem. This problem framing should assist in explaining the relationships within the context of Afghanistan – and will assist in determining the actions to take in the next two years in Afghanistan.

TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 provides some guidance on problem framing; the tasks associated with problem framing are:

· Establish the strategic context
· Synthesize strategic guidance
· Describe the systemic nature of the problem(s) to be solved
· Determine strategic trends
· Identify gaps in knowledge
· Establish assumptions about the problem
· Identify the operational problem
· Determine Initial Mission Statement
· Obtain Approval of the Problem and Mission Statement

Key to this effort will be many of the topics discussed in earlier blogs: Framing the Problem; Problem Identification; Determination of an End State, and Development of Logical Lines of Operation / Effort. As LTG Caldwell notes, “the situation in Iraq continues to improve while in Afghanistan it deteriorates.” The “wicked problem” of Afghanistan will no doubt be a topic of intense study in action in the next two years.